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Abstract
The puzzle of sea battle involves an argument that is an instantiation
of reasoning by cases. Its premises include the conditionals “if there is
a/no sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so”. It has a fatalistic con-
clusion. Two readings of necessity can be distinguished: absolute and
relative necessity. The conditionals are valid for the latter reading. By
the restrictor view of “if” in linguistics, the conditionals are not material
implication. Instead, the if-clauses in them are devices for restricting the
discourse domain that consists of possible futures. As a consequence, the
argument is not sound. We present a dynamic temporal logic to formalize
this idea. The base of this logic is CTL∗ without the operator until. The
logic has a dynamic operator that shrinks models. The completeness of
the logic is shown by reducing the dynamic operator.
1 The Puzzle of Sea Battle
The puzzle of sea battle is from Aristotle. Either there will be a sea battle
tomorrow or not. If there is a sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so. If there
is no sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so. So either necessarily there will be
a sea battle tomorrow or necessarily there will be no sea battle tomorrow. Here
“necessary” is understood as “inevitable”: something is necessary if it is the case
no matter what we will do. The conclusion seems fatalistic and unacceptable.
There are two ways out: either arguing that the argument is not sound or
arguing that its premises are not all true. The argument is a special case of
reasoning by cases: from “φ1 or φ2”, “if φ1 then ψ1” and “if φ2 then ψ2”, we
get “ψ1 or ψ2”. The argument has three premises. The first one may be called
the principle of excluded future middle. The second and third may be called the
principle of necessity of truth: true propositions are necessary.
The previous solutions to this puzzle presuppose the validity of the argu-
ment and adopt the latter strategy. They focus on the following issue: how do
we ascribe truth values to the statements such as “there will be a sea battle
tomorrow”? These statements are called future contingents in the literature:
they are about the future but do not have an absolute sense.
These solutions include Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic [5], Prior’s Peircean
temporal logic [8], Prior’s Ockhamist temporal logic [8], the true futurist the-
ory [6], the supervaluationist theory [11] and the relativist theory [4]. In the
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first two, the principle of excluded future middle fails. In others, the principle
of necessity of truth does not hold. Except Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic,
other solutions use branching time models. In a branching time model, time
is represented as a tree. At any state, there is only one history but might be
many possible futures. We refer to [7] for detailed comparison between these
solutions.
There are two senses of necessity, absolute and relative necessity, determined
by how we understand whatever we will do. Decision makes the difference. In
reality we make decisions to do something or not to do something. So we will
not do whatever we are able to do. We may read whatever we will do relative to
the domain consisting of the things that we are able to do. We may also read it
relative to the domain consisting of the things that we are able to do but have
not decided to avoid. Note that doing a thing in the first domain but not in the
second involves changing mind. A proposition is absolutely necessary if it is the
case no matter which we choose to do from the big domain. A proposition is
relatively necessary if it is the case no matter which we choose to do from the
small domain. Accordingly, we have two principles of necessity of truth.
The principle of absolute necessity of truth does not hold for future contin-
gents. Assume that the admiral is able to do two things: a and b. Doing a
will cause a sea battle tomorrow but doing b will not. He decides to do a. In
this case, it sounds plausible to say that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
However, it is strange of saying that there will be a sea battle tomorrow no
matter what the admiral will do in the absolute sense.
We think that the principle of relative necessity of truth holds for future
contingents. Assume that it is not necessary that φ will be the case. Then
someone has a way to act to make φ not the case in the future without changing
his decision. In this situation, it seems hard to say that φ will be the case.
Therefore, if φ will be the case, it is necessary that φ will be the case.
The puzzle of sea battle disappears under the absolute sense of necessity
because the principle of necessity of truth fails for future contingents. However,
it is still puzzling under the relative sense of necessity. The principle of excluded
future middle is quite intuitive. So all the three premises of the puzzle seem
valid. But the conclusion is still problematic. Suppose that doing a will cause
a sea battle tomorrow but doing b will not. Assume that the admiral has not
made the decision to do a or b. Then it is wrong to say that there will necessarily
be a sea battle tomorrow. It is also wrong to say that there will necessarily not
be a sea battle tomorrow. So the conclusion of the puzzle is false. How come
we get a false conclusion from three valid premises by a sound inference?
The soundness of reasoning by cases presupposes that the two conditionals
in it are material implications. However, if the two conditionals are something
else, then reasoning by cases might not be a sound argument.
In linguistics, a different view on conditionals is common, that is, the re-
strictor view. The conditional if φ then ψ is not a connective connecting two
sentences. There is no such a connective in natural languages. Utterance of
a sentence is always w.r.t. a specific discourse domain. The if-clause if φ is a
device for restricting the domain. The conditional if φ then ψ is true w.r.t. a
domain if ψ is true w.r.t. the resulted domain. Conditionals collapse to material
implications when discourse domains are a singletons. This view can be found
in various works including [3], [2] and [13]. It can be tracked back to Ramsey
Test in [9].
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Reasoning by cases is not generally valid under the restrictor view on con-
ditionals. Let ∆ be a discourse domain. Assume that if φ1 then ψ1 and if φ2
then ψ2 are true w.r.t. ∆. Let ∆
φ1 and ∆φ2 be the respect results of restricting
∆ with if φ1 and if φ2. Then what the two conditionals say is just that ψ1 is
true w.r.t. ∆φ1 and ψ2 true w.r.t. ∆
φ2 . If neither the truth of ψ1 nor the
truth of ψ2 is upward monotonic relative to discourse domains, then
it is possible that neither ψ1 nor ψ2 is true w.r.t. ∆.
The discourse domain of the puzzle of sea battle consists of possible futures.
The if-clauses “if there is a/no sea battle tomorrow” restrict the domain. How-
ever, relative necessity is not a upward monotonic notion w.r.t. the class of
possible futures. Therefore, the argument concerning sea battle is not sound.
In what follows we present a logic to formalize this idea.
2 Formal Settings
Let Φ0 be a countable set of atomic propositions and p range over it. Define a
language ΦXL as follows:
φ ∶∶= p ∣ ⊺ ∣ ¬φ ∣ (φ ∧ φ) ∣ Xφ ∣ Aφ ∣ [ψ]φ
where ψ is from ΦX[⋅], the sub-language of ΦXL generated from Φ0 under X and
[⋅].
The featured formulas of ΦXL are read as follows:
1. Xφ: φ will be the case in the next moment.
2. Aφ: no matter how the agent will act in the future, φ is the case now,
that is, φ is necessary.
3. [ψ]φ: given ψ, φ is the case.
The principle of excluded future middle is expressed as Xφ∨X¬φ and the prin-
ciple of necessity of truth as [φ]Aφ.
Xφ is a temporal formula. p, ⊺ andAφ are state formulas. [ψ]φ is a temporal
formula if φ is, or else a state formula. Later we will see that temporal formulas
are evaluated at states into paths and state formulas evaluated just at states.
The other usual propositional connectives and the falsum  are defined in
the usual way. Eφ, defined as ¬A¬φ, indicates that the agent has a way to act
in the future s.t. φ is the case now, that is, φ is possible.
It seems strange to say that the agent has a way to act in the future s.t. φ
is the case now. Actually this is fine, as whether a sentence involving future is
true or not now might be dependent on how the agent will act in the future.
For example, whether a student will pass an exam is dependent on how he will
study.
LetW be a nonempty set of states and R a binary relation on it. A sequence
w0 . . . wn of states is called a R-sequence if w0R . . .Rwn. As a limit case, w is a
R-sequence for any w. (W,R) is a tree if there is a r s.t. for any w, there is a
unique R-sequence from r to w. r is called the root. It can be seen that the root
is unique and R is irreflexive. R is serial if for any w, there is a u s.t. Rwu.
We say that a tree (W,R) is serial if R is. A serial tree is understood as a
time structure encoding an agent’s actions (the transitions) and states in time
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(the nodes). A branching in the tree is interpreted as a situation in which the
agent can choose between different possible actions. The seriality corresponds
to the fact that the agent can always perform an action at any given time.
Fix a serial tree (W,R). Here are some auxiliary notations. A R-sequence
w0 . . . wn starting at the root is a history of wn. For any states w and u, u is
a historical state of w if there is a R-sequence u0 . . . un s.t. 0 < n, u0 = u and
un = w. w is a future state of u if u is a historical state of w. Note that a state
can not be a historical or future state of itself.
An infinite R-sequence is a path. A path starting at the root is a timeline.
A path w0 . . . passes through a state x if x = wi for some i > 0. Let pi be a
path. We use pi(i) to denote the i + 1-th element of pi, ipi the prefix of pi to the
i + 1-th element, and pii the suffix of pi from the i + 1-th element. For example,
if pi = w0 . . . , then pi(2) = w2,
2pi = w0w1w2 and pi
2 = w2 . . . . For any history
w0 . . . wn and path u0 . . . , if wn = u0, let w0 . . . wn ⊗ u0 . . . denote the timeline
w0 . . . wnu1 . . . .
M = (W,R, r, V ) is a model if (W,R) is a serial tree with r as the root and
V is a function from Φ0 to 2
W . Figure 1 illustrates a model.
q
p
q q
r
q
r
w0 w1 w2 w3
u v
s
⋰ ⋰
⋱
. . .
Figure 1: This figure indicates a model. w0 is the root. Arrows are transitions.
Definition 1 (Semantics). M, pi, i ⊩ φ, the formula φ being true at the state
pi(i) relative to the timeline pi in the model M, meets the following conditions:
M, pi, i ⊩ p ⇔ pi(i) ∈ V (p)
M, pi, i ⊩ ⊺
M, pi, i ⊩ ¬φ ⇔ not M, pi, i ⊩ φ
M, pi, i ⊩ φ ∧ψ ⇔ M, pi, i ⊩ φ and M, pi, i ⊩ ψ
M, pi, i ⊩ Xφ ⇔ M, pi, i + 1 ⊩ φ
M, pi, i ⊩Aφ ⇔ for any path ρ starting at pi(i), M, ipi ⊗ ρ, i ⊩ φ
M, pi, i ⊩ [φ]ψ ⇔ Mφ
pi(i)
, pi, i ⊩ ψ if (Mφ
pi(i)
, ψ) is well given
By (Mφ
pi(i)
, ψ) is well given, we mean that Mφ
pi(i)
is defined and pi is a path of
it. Note that M, pi, i ⊩ [φ]ψ holds trivially if (Mφ
pi(i)
, ψ) is not well given. Mφw
is defined in parallel as follows. Fix a model M = (W,R, r, V ). We say that φ is
achievable at w in M if φ is true at w relative to a path from w. Let W ′ ⊆W . A
structure (W ′,R′, V ′) is called the restriction of M to W ′ if R′ = R∩(W ′×W ′)
and V ′(p) = V (p) ∩W ′.
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Definition 2 (Update of models). LetM = (W,R, r, V ) be a model, φ a formula
and w a state. Assume that φ is achievable at w. Let w0 . . . wi be the history
of w. Define a set Xφw of states as follows: for any x ∈W , x ∈ X
φ
w ⇔ (i) x is a
future state of w and (ii) there is no timeline ρ passing through w and
x s.t. M, ρ,w ⊩ φ. Define Mφw as (W −X
φ
w,R
′, r, V ′), the restriction of M to
W −Xφw. M
φ
w is called the result of updating M at w with φ.
M
φ
w is undefined if φ is not achievable at w.
The operatorA can be viewed as a universal quantifier over possible futures.
The truth of a state formula at a state relative to a path is not dependent on
the path, but this is not the case for temporal formulas. In some cases, if φ is a
state formula, we write M,w ⊩ φ without specifying a path. Sometimes, if pi is
a timeline of M containing w, we use M, pi,w ⊩ φ instead of M, pi, i ⊩ φ where
pi(i) = w.
The meaning of [φ] lies in how φ updates models. Updating M with φ at
w is to shrink M by removing the states in Xφw. X
φ
w can be understood as
follows. Assume that the agent is at w and decides to make φ true. After the
decision is made, some future states are not possible anymore. A state becomes
impossible if the agent travels to it, there would be no way to make φ true at
w, no matter where he goes afterwards. Xφw is the collection of these states.
Figure 2 illustrates how a formula updates a model.
q
p
q q
r
q
r
w0 w1 w2 w3
u v
s
⋰ ⋰
⋱
. . .
M
q q q q
r
w0 w1 w2 w3
v
⋰
. . .
M
Xq∧XX¬r
w0
Figure 2: This figure illustrates how a model is shrunk by a formula. The right
model is the result of updating the left one at w0 with X¬r ∧XX¬r.
Suppose that φ is achievable at w. It can be verified that r ∉ Xφw and X
φ
w
is closed under R. So (W −Xφw,R
′) is a tree with r as the root. It can also be
verified that R′ is serial. It follows that (W −Xφw,R
′, r, V ′) is a model. Note
that it is possible that pi is not a timeline of Mφw. So (M
φ
pi(i)
, pi) might not be
well given. Later we will see that pi is a timeline of Mφ
pi(i)
iff M, pi, i ⊩ φ.
A formula φ is valid if for any M, pi and i, M, pi, i ⊩ φ. Let Γ be a set
of formulas and φ a formula. Γ ⊧ φ, Γ entails φ, if for any M, pi and i, if
M, pi, i ⊩ Γ, then M, pi, i ⊩ φ. We in the sequel use XL to denote the set of valid
formulas.
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3 The Puzzle Is Solved in a Way
The update with φ shrinks models. As a consequence, it restricts possible
futures. The following theorem indicates that it restricts possible futures as we
wish: it exactly excludes the possible futures which does not satisfy φ.
Let N be the set of natural numbers. Define a function σ ∶ ΦX[⋅] → N as
follows:
pσ = 0
⊺
σ = 0
(¬φ)σ = φσ
(φ ∧ψ)σ = max{φσ, ψσ}
(Xφ)σ = φσ + 1
([φ]ψ)σ = max{φσ, ψσ}
φσ intuitively indicates how far φ can see forward.
Lemma 1. Let n be a natural number and φ a formula in ΦX[⋅] s.t. φ
σ ≤ n.
Let M be a model and w a state.
(a) For any timelines pi and τ of M passing through w, if they share the same
n elements after w, then M, pi,w ⊩ φ iff M, τ,w ⊩ φ.
(b) For any timeline pi of M passing through w, (Mφw, pi) is well-given iff
M, pi,w ⊩ φ.
Proof. We show the results (a) and (b) in parallel by inductions on m and φ.
Note that ifM, pi,w ⊩ φ, then Mφw is defined and pi a path ofM
φ
w by Definition
2. So the right-left direction of (b) holds. This direction will not be considered
in the sequel.
Case n = 0. The subcase φ = ⊺ is trivial and the subcase φ = Xψ impossible.
Subcase φ = p.
(a) Clearly M, pi,w ⊩ p iff M, τ,w ⊩ p.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ p. Then Mpw is undefined and (M
p
w, pi) not well given.
Subcase φ = ¬ψ.
(a) By the inductive hypothesis,M, pi,w ⊩ ψ iffM, τ,w ⊩ ψ. ThenM, pi,w ⊩
¬ψ iff M, τ,w ⊩ ¬ψ.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ ¬ψ. Then M, pi,w ⊩ ψ. Let τ be an arbitrary timeline
of M through w. By the inductive hypothesis, M, τ,w ⊩ ψ. Then M, τ,w /⊩ ¬ψ.
Then M¬ψw is undefined and (M
¬ψ
w , pi) not well given.
Subcase φ = ψ ∧ χ.
(a) By the inductive hypothesis,M, pi,w ⊩ ψ iffM, τ,w ⊩ ψ, andM, pi,w ⊩ χ
iff M, τ,w ⊩ χ. Then M, pi,w ⊩ ψ ∧ χ iff M, τ,w ⊩ ψ ∧ χ.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ ψ ∧ χ. Then M, pi,w /⊩ ψ or M, pi,w /⊩ χ. Assume
the former. Let τ be an arbitrary timeline of M through w. By the inductive
hypothesis, M, τ,w /⊩ ψ. Then M, τ,w /⊩ ψ ∧ χ. Then Mψ∧χw is undefined and
(Mψ∧χw , pi) not well given. In a similar way, we can get that if M, pi,w /⊩ χ, then
(Mψ∧χw , pi) is not well given either.
Subcase φ = [ψ]χ.
(a) Assume M, pi,w ⊩ [ψ]χ. Then if (Mψw, pi) is well given, M
ψ
w, pi,w ⊩ χ.
By the inductive hypothesis, (Mψw, pi) is well given iff M, pi,w ⊩ ψ, M, pi,w ⊩ ψ
iff M, τ,w ⊩ ψ, M, τ,w ⊩ ψ iff (Mψw, τ) is well given, and M
ψ
w, pi,w ⊩ χ iff
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M
ψ
w, τ,w ⊩ χ. Then if (M
ψ
w, τ) is well given, M
ψ
w, τ,w ⊩ χ. Then M, τ,w ⊩
[ψ]χ. Similarly, we can show that if M, τ,w ⊩ [ψ]χ, then M, pi,w ⊩ [ψ]χ.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ [ψ]χ. Then (Mψw, pi) is well given but M
ψ
w, pi,w /⊩ χ.
Let τ be a timeline of M through w. In a similar way as (a), we know M, τ,w /⊩
[ψ]χ. Then M
[ψ]χ
w is undefined and (M
[ψ]χ
w , pi) not well given.
Case n = k + 1. The subcases φ = p and φ = ⊺ are impossible.
Subcase φ = ¬ψ.
(a) Similar arguments with the case n = 0.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ ¬ψ. Then M, pi,w ⊩ ψ. Let τ be an arbitrary timeline
of M passing through w and sharing the same n elements after w with pi. By
the inductive hypothesis, M, τ,w ⊩ ψ. Then M, τ,w /⊩ ¬ψ. Let u be the n-th
element of pi after w. By Definition 2, u is not in M¬ψw if M
¬ψ
w is defined.
Then (M¬ψw , pi) is not well given.
Subcase φ = ψ ∧ χ.
(a) Similar arguments with the case n = 0.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ ψ ∧ χ. Then M, pi,w /⊩ ψ or M, pi,w /⊩ χ. Assume
the former. Let τ be an arbitrary timeline of M passing through w and sharing
the same n elements after w with pi. By the inductive hypothesis, M, τ,w /⊩ ψ.
Then M, τ,w /⊩ ψ ∧χ. Let u be the n-th element of pi after w. Then u is not in
M
ψ∧χ
w if M
ψ∧χ
w is defined. Then (M
ψ∧χ
w , pi) is not well given. In a similar way,
we can get that if M, pi,w /⊩ χ, then (Mψ∧χw , pi) is not well given either.
Subcase φ = Xψ.
(a) Let pi(i) = w. By the inductive hypothesis, M, pi, i ⊩ Xψ iffM, pi, i+1 ⊩ ψ
iff M, τ, i + 1 ⊩ ψ iff M, τ, i ⊩ Xψ.
(b) Let pi(i) = w. Assume M, pi, i /⊩ Xψ. Then M, pi, i + 1 /⊩ ψ. Let τ be
an arbitrary timeline of M passing through w and sharing the same n elements
after w with pi. Then τ shares the same k elements after pi(i + 1) with pi. By
inductive hypothesis, M, τ, i + 1 /⊩ ψ. Then M, τ, i /⊩ Xψ. Let u be the n-th
element of pi after w. Then u is not in MXψw if M
Xψ
w is defined. Then (M
Xψ
w , pi)
is not well given.
Subcase φ = [ψ]χ.
(a) Similar arguments with the case n = 0.
(b) Assume M, pi,w /⊩ [ψ]χ. Then (Mψw, pi) is well given but M
ψ
w, pi,w /⊩ χ.
Let τ be a timeline of M passing through w and sharing the same n elements
after w with pi. In a similar way as (a), we get M, τ,w /⊩ [ψ]χ. Let u be the
n-th element of pi after w. Then u is not in M
[ψ]χ
w if M
[ψ]χ
w is defined. Then
(M
[ψ]χ
w , pi) is not well given.
Theorem 1. Let M be a model, w a state and φ a formula of ΦX[⋅] achievable
at w. For any timeline pi of M passing through w, pi is a timeline of Mφw iff
M, pi,w ⊩ φ.
Proof. As φ is achievable at w, Mφw is defined. Let pi be a timeline of M passing
through w. Assume M, pi,w ⊩ φ. By the definition of Mφw, all the elements of pi
are in Mφw. So pi is a timeline of M
φ
w. Assume that pi is a timeline of M
φ
w. Let
pi = w0 . . . and wi = w. Let φ
σ = n. As wi+n is a future state of wi and wi+n is
in Mφw, there is a timeline ρ passing through wi+n s.t. M, ρ,w ⊩ φ. pi share the
same n elements after w with ρ. By Lemma 1, M, pi,w ⊩ φ.
We now show that the principle of necessity of truth, [φ]Aφ, is valid. Let
ΦX denote the sub-language of ΦX[⋅] generated from Φ0 under X.
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Lemma 2. For any φ in ΦX[⋅], there is a ψ in ΦX equivalent to φ.
From Lemma 1 we can get a simple fact: for any φ and ψ in ΦX, [φ]ψ is
equivalent to φ→ ψ. Based on this fact, we can show this lemma in an inductive
way.
If a formula φ contains no A and [⋅], then its truth value at a state relative
to a timeline is determined by the timeline itself. As ΦX[⋅] can be reduced to
ΦX, what follows is true.
Lemma 3. Let (Mφw, pi) be well given. For any ψ in ΦX[⋅], M
φ
w, pi,w ⊩ ψ iff
M, pi,w ⊩ ψ.
Theorem 2. [φ]Aφ is valid.
Proof. Assume M, pi, i /⊩ [φ]Aφ. Then Mφ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩Aφ. Then there is a path ρ
in Mφ
pi(i)
starting at pi(i) s.t. Mφ
pi(i)
, ipi⊗ρ, i /⊩ φ. By Lemma 3, M, ipi⊗ρ, i /⊩ φ.
By Lemma 1, ρ is not a path of Mφ
pi(i)
. We have a contradiction.
Let s denote that there is a sea battle. The puzzle of sea battle can be
formalized as the inference Xs ∨X¬s, [Xs]AXs, [X¬s]AX¬s ⊧AXs ∨AX¬s. It
is easy to see that AXs ∨AX¬s is not valid. It is also easy to get that the
principle of excluded future middle, Xφ ∨X¬φ, holds. Therefore, the puzzle of
sea battle is not a sound argument.
It can be verified that ¬φ /⊧ [φ]ψ. For example, ¬Xp /⊧ [Xp]E¬Xp. So
the notorious problem with material implication is not a problem here. [φ]ψ
collapses to the material implication φ → ψ if φ is a state formula. The reason
is as follows. Assume that φ is a state formula. Fix a model M and a state w.
Then φ is true or false at w. Suppose that φ is true at w. Then the update
with φ at w does not change M. Then the truth conditions of [φ]ψ and φ→ ψ
at w relative to any timeline are the same. Suppose that φ is false at w. Then
the update with φ at w fails. Then both [φ]ψ and φ→ ψ are trivially true at w
relative to any timeline.
4 Completeness by Reduction
The idea of showing the completeness of XL is to reduce the dynamic operator
[φ] in [φ]ψ. This idea is from dynamic epistemic logic [12]. To reduce [φ],
a strategy is to massage [φ] into ψ deeper and deeper until it meets atomic
propositions. A difficulty arises when [φ] meets the operator X. To handle this,
some pretreatment of φ is needed.
Let ΦPC be the set of formulas of Propositional Calculus.
Lemma 4. For any φ in ΦX, there are ψ1, . . . , ψn in ΦPC and χ1, . . . , χn in ΦX
s.t. φ is equivalent to (ψ1 ∨Xχ1) ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ (ψn ∨Xχn).
The operator X can freely go into and out of conjunctions and disjunctions:
X(φ ∧ ψ) ↔ (Xφ ∧Xψ) and X(φ ∨ ψ) ↔ (Xφ ∨Xψ) are valid. By making a
reflection we can see that this lemma holds.
Lemma 5. [φ ∧ ψ]χ↔ [φ][ψ]χ is valid.
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Proof. Firstly, we show that Mφ∧ψw is defined iff (M
φ
w)
ψ
w is defined. Assume that
M
φ∧ψ
w is defined. Then M, pi,w ⊩ φ ∧ ψ for some pi through w. By Lemma
1, Mφw is defined and pi is a path of M
φ
w. By Lemma 3, M
φ
w, pi,w ⊩ ψ. Then
(Mφw)
ψ
w is defined. Now assume that (M
φ
w)
ψ
w is defined. Then M
φ
w, pi,w ⊩ ψ for
some pi through w. By Theorem 2, Mφw, τ,w ⊩ φ for any τ through w. Then
M
φ
w, pi,w ⊩ φ ∧ ψ. By Lemma 3, M, pi,w ⊩ φ ∧ψ. Then M
φ∧ψ
w is defined.
Secondly, we show Mφ∧ψw = (M
φ
w)
ψ
w. It suffices to show that M
φ∧ψ
w and
(Mφw)
ψ
w have the same timelines through w. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 3,
what follows is the case: pi is a timeline of Mφ∧ψw through w ⇔ M, pi,w ⊩ φ∧ψ
⇔ pi is a timeline of Mφw through w and M
φ
w, pi,w ⊩ ψ ⇔ pi is a timeline of
(Mφw)
ψ
w through w.
By the previous results, what follows is the case: M, pi,w /⊩ [φ ∧ ψ]χ ⇔
M
φ∧ψ
w , pi,w /⊩ χ⇔ (M
φ
w)
ψ
w, pi,w /⊩ χ⇔M
φ
w, pi,w /⊩ [ψ]χ⇔M, pi,w /⊩ [φ][ψ]χ.
From this result and Lemma 2, it follows that [φ][ψ]χ is equivalent to [φ ∧
[φ]ψ]χ.
Lemma 6. Let φ be in ΦXL and M, pi, i ⊩ Xφ. Then the generated submodels
of MXφ
pi(i)
and Mφ
pi(i+1)
at pi(i + 1) are identical.
Lemma 7.
1. [φ]p↔ (φ→ p)
2. [φ]⊺↔ ⊺
3. [φ]¬ψ↔ (φ→ ¬[φ]ψ)
4. [φ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([φ]ψ ∧ [φ]χ)
5. [φ ∨Xψ]Xχ↔ ((φ→ Xχ) ∧ (¬φ→ X[ψ]χ)) where φ is in ΦPC
6. [φ]Aψ↔ (φ→A[φ]ψ)
Proof. 5. AssumeM, pi, i /⊩ [φ∨Xψ]Xχ. ThenM, pi, i ⊩ φ∨Xψ andMφ∨Xψ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩
Xχ. AssumeM, pi, i ⊩ φ. As φ is in ΦPC, M
φ∨Xψ
pi(i)
=M. Then M, pi, i /⊩ Xχ. Then
M, pi, i /⊩ φ→ Xχ. Assume M, pi, i ⊩ ¬φ. As φ is in ΦPC, M
φ∨Xψ
pi(i)
= MXψ
pi(i)
. Then
M
Xψ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩ Xχ. Then MXψ
pi(i)
, pi, i + 1 /⊩ χ. By Lemma 6, Mψ
pi(i+1)
, pi, i + 1 /⊩ χ.
Then M, pi, i + 1 /⊩ [ψ]χ. Then M, pi, i /⊩ X[ψ]χ. Then M, pi, i /⊩ ¬φ→ X[ψ]χ.
Assume M, pi, i /⊩ φ → Xχ. Then M, pi, i ⊩ φ and M, pi, i /⊩ Xχ. Then
M
φ∨Xψ
pi(i)
= M. Then Mφ∨Xψ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩ Xχ. Then M, pi, i /⊩ [φ ∨ Xψ]Xχ. Assume
M, pi, i /⊩ ¬φ→ X[ψ]χ. Then M, pi, i ⊩ ¬φ and M, pi, i /⊩ X[ψ]χ. Then Mφ∨Xψ
pi(i)
=
M
Xψ
pi(i)
. Then M, pi, i + 1 /⊩ [ψ]χ. Then Mψ
pi(i+1)
, pi, i + 1 /⊩ χ. By Lemma 6,
M
Xψ
pi(i)
, pi, i + 1 /⊩ χ. Then MXψ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩ Xχ. Then Mφ∨Xψ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩ Xχ. Then
M, pi, i /⊩ [φ ∨Xψ]Xχ.
6. Assume M, pi, i /⊩ φ → A[φ]ψ. Then M, pi, i ⊩ φ but M, pi, i /⊩ A[φ]ψ.
By Lemma 1, pi is in Mφ
pi(i)
. Then there is a ρ starting at pi(i) s.t. M, ipi ⊗
ρ, i /⊩ [φ]ψ. Then Mφ
pi(i)
, ipi ⊗ ρ, i /⊩ ψ. Then Mφ
pi(i)
, ipi ⊗ ρ, i /⊩ Aψ. Then
M
φ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩Aψ. Then M, pi, i /⊩ [φ]Aψ.
AssumeM, pi, i /⊩ [φ]Aψ. Then (Mφ
pi(i)
, pi) is well given butMφ
pi(i)
, pi, i /⊩Aψ.
By Lemma 1, M, pi, i ⊩ φ. Then there is a ρ starting at pi(i) in Mφ
pi(i)
s.t.
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M
φ
pi(i)
, ipi ⊗ ρ, i /⊩ ψ. Then M, ipi ⊗ ρ, i /⊩ [φ]ψ. Then M, pi, i /⊩ A[φ]ψ. Then
M, pi, i /⊩ φ→A[φ]ψ.
Let ΦXA denote the language generated from Φ0 under X and A.
Theorem 3. The language ΦXL can be reduced to ΦXA.
Proof. Let θ be a formula in ΦXL. We pick a subformula of θ which is in the
form of [φ]ψ where ψ contains no [⋅]. Note that if θ has no such a subformula,
then θ contains no [⋅] and is already in ΦXA. Then we do the following things:
1. By Lemma 2, we can find φ′ in ΦX equivalent to φ. We transform [φ] to
[φ′].
2. By Lemma 4, we can find ψ1, . . . , ψn in ΦPC and χ1, . . . , χn in ΦX s.t.
(ψ1 ∨ Xχ1) ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ (ψn ∨ Xχn) is equivalent to φ
′. We transform [φ′] to
[(ψ1 ∨Xχ1) ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ (ψn ∨Xχn)].
3. We transform [(ψ1∨Xχ1)∧⋅ ⋅ ⋅∧(ψn∨Xχn)] to [(ψ1∨Xχ1)] . . . [(ψn∨Xχn)].
By Lemma 5, they have the same effects.
4. In the way specified by the last four items of Lemma 7, we let [(ψn ∨
Xχn)] into ψ deeper and deeper until it meets atomic propositions. Note
when [(ψn∨Xχn)]meets X, it becomes [χn]. Then we reduce [(ψn∨Xχn)]
in the way specified by the first two items of Lemma 7. We repeat until
[(ψ1 ∨Xχ1)] is reduced.
We repeat until θ contains no [⋅].
The completeness of the logic for the language ΦXA is already shown
in the literature. Then we can get the completeness of the logic XL.
5 Conclusive Remarks
The argument in the puzzle of sea battle is a special case of reasoning by cases.
Its premises include the conditionals “if there is a/no sea battle tomorrow, it is
necessarily so”. It has a fatalistic conclusion: we can not interfere with whether
there will be a sea battle tomorrow. The principle expressed by the conditionals
are plausible if we read necessity in the relative sense. The conditionals are not
material implication. Instead, the if-clauses in them are devices for restricting
possible futures. Necessity is not a upward monotonic notion. So the argument
is not valid. It is fine that an invalid argument has a fatalistic conclusion. We
present a formal way to make this precise.
Reading conditionals as material implication makes reasoning by cases valid.
This causes others puzzles. Among them is the Puzzle of Miners presented by
[10]. [1] proposes a deontic logic based on an extension of CTL∗. By applying
the approach in this work to the deontic logic, we might get a solution to the
Puzzle of Miners. This is our future work.
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